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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Equality of opportunity (EOp) is a widely accepted principle of distributive
justice in western liberal societies and it is the leading idea of most political
platforms in several countries. The crucial role played by the educational sys-
tem in determining the extent of equality of opportunity and intergenerational
mobility in a society is also broadly recognized. It is, therefore, of prime policy
interest to evaluate the eﬀects of education policies from the point of view of
equality of opportunity. However, in addition to data limitation and empirical
constraints, such evaluation is by no means straightforward from a theoretical
point of view.
It is sometimes thought that opportunity equalization, in the dimension of
education, is implemented by the provision of equal educational resources to all
young citizens; alternatively, by the provision of equality in the educational at-
tainments of all individuals. At times, “equality of opportunities for education”
is invoked as the “right” principle of justice in that particular sphere of social
life.
What does this exactly means? Arrow et al. (2000) for instance argue that
“even so basic a concept as equality of educational opportunity eludes deﬁnition,
with proposals ranging from securing the absence of overt discrimination based
2on race or gender to the far more ambitious goal of eliminating race, gender,
and class diﬀerences in educational outcomes” (pp. ix).
This state of aﬀairs is the starting point of our paper, which contributes
to the literature in three ways: ﬁrst, building on the literature on equality of
opportunity that has recently ﬂourished in the area of social choice and norma-
tive economics, it proposes a deﬁnition of equality of educational opportunities.
Second, the paper develops a methodology in order to test for the existence
of equality of opportunity in a given distribution and to rank distributions ac-
cording to equality of opportunity. Third, we present empirical evidence on the
degree of equality of educational opportunity in the Italian university system.
The theory of equality of opportunity that has been developed recently in
the area of normative economics goes far beyond the ideas of non discrimination
and absence of legal barriers. On the other hand, it does not require equality
of ﬁnal achievements for individuals of diﬀerent race, gender or social back-
ground. Rather, after the inﬂuential contributions by Arneson (1989), Barry
(1991), Cohen (1989), Dworkin (1981), Roemer (1993, 1998) and Sen (1980),
this literature has explored the conception of equality of opportunity as “level-
ing the playing ﬁeld” according to which society should split equally the means
to reach a valuable outcome among its members; once the set of opportunities
have been equalized, which particular opportunity, the individual chooses from
those open to her, is outside the scope of justice. As Roemer (1998) puts it, “in
the notion of equality of opportunity there is a before and an after: before the
competition starts opportunities must be equalized, but after it begins individ-
uals are on their own”. Ex ante inequalities, and only those inequalities, should
be eliminated or compensated for by public intervention. Translated in terms
of inequality measurement, this means that ex ante inequalities (i.e. inequal-
ities in the set of opportunities open to individuals) are inequitable while ex
post inequalities (i.e., inequalities in the ﬁnal achievements) are not necessarily
inequitable.
There is an extensive literature concerned with the measurement of inequal-
ity of opportunity, with both a theoretical and an empirical ﬂavor. For theoret-
ical models see, among others, Arlegi and Nieto (1999), Bossert et al. (1999),
Herrero (1997), Herrero et al. (1998), Kranich (1996, 1997, 2003), Ok (1997),
Ok and Kranich (1998), Savaglio and Vannucci (2007), Weymark (2003). In
these models each individual is endowed with a given (abstract) set of opportu-
nities and the society is represented as a proﬁle of opportunity sets. Therefore,
the problem of measuring the degree of opportunity inequality is handled by
characterizing inequality rankings of proﬁles of opportunity sets. This approach
is surely correct in principle; however, its empirical implementation is severely
constrained by data limitation. Typically, the ex-ante opportunities open to in-
dividuals are not observable, while the actual choices are. Hence, a model able
to infer the ex ante opportunities from some observable variables is needed.
The contributions by Roemer (1998), Betts and Roemer (2003), Roemer et al.
(2003), Aaberge et al. (2003), which focus on the design of opportunity egali-
tarian policies, and the contributions by Bourguignon et al. (2003), Goux and
Maurin (2003), Checchi and Peragine (2005), Dardanoni et al. (2006), Lefranc
3et al. (2006 a,b), O’Neill et al. (1999), Peragine (2002, 2004, 2005), Ruiz-
Castillo (2000) and Villar (2006), which instead focus on the measurement of
inequality of opportunity for income, are in this line.
In this paper we build on the approaches developed by Peragine (2004, 2005)
and by Lefranc et al. (2006 a,b). We focus on the equality of educational op-
portunities for individuals of diﬀerent social backgrounds and ask the following
questions: when are educational opportunities of individuals of diﬀerent back-
grounds equalized? How to rank diﬀerent systems according to the degree of
opportunity inequality they exhibit?
All the literature on opportunity inequality mentioned before revolves around
the idea that (i) individual outcomes (income, educational achievements, etc.)
are determined by two classes of variables: circumstances, which include all the
factors outside the sphere of individual responsibility, and eﬀort, including all
the factors for which the individual is held responsible and that (ii) a measure of
opportunity inequality can be obtained by measuring that portion of outcome
inequality which is explained or determined by diﬀerences in circumstances.
Then, the approaches used diﬀer from each other in the techniques the authors
propose to capture such an eﬀect.
Now, the application of such a conceptual framework to the educational
opportunities is problematic for several reasons.
A ﬁrst diﬃculty arises by arguing that the distinction between circumstances
and eﬀort is not relevant in education (De Villé, 2003): is it reasonable to hold
pupils accountable for their eﬀort, given that they are not adults? Can we
consider them to be fully able to take autonomous and informed decisions?
During a large fraction of their school years, individuals are not considered to
be perfect judges for themselves and, in fact, in many aspects of social life, a
paternalistic approach is adopted with respect to children and teenagers. If we
push this argument far enough, we would conclude that circumstances account
for virtually all the variability of educational outcomes, and that the policy
objective must be one of equalizing pupils’ educational achievements. Along
those lines, we believe that this objection makes sense with respect to the general
problem of measuring opportunity inequality in education. However, in this
paper we focus on the university system, where students are adult citizens, and
therefore personal commitment and eﬀort can be considered to be under their
control.1
A second question related to the partition in circumstances and eﬀort con-
cerns the status of innate abilities. Innate talents and abilities are exogenous
variables, chosen by nature and not by individuals. That is to say that they be-
long to the set of circumstances. Thus, according to the opportunity egalitarian
ethics, society should compensate pupils for the diﬀerent endowments in talents
in order to neutralize their eﬀect on the ﬁnal achievement. However, such a pre-
scription seems in contrast with a role generally attributed to the educational
system in a society which seeks to be meritocratic: the role of selecting talents
and “signaling” those talents, together with the acquired competencies, to the
1For a discussion on this issue see Waltenberg (2006).
4labour market. In general, eﬃciency considerations suggest much caution in de-
signing measures intended to neutralize the eﬀects of diﬀerent abilities. Hence,
the inclusion of talents and abilities within the set of circumstances in the realm
of education seems particularly problematic. In our empirical speciﬁcation the
individual circumstances are represented only by family background, measured
by the parental education; hence, we implicitly assume that talents are part of
the individual sphere of responsibility.
A ﬁnal question refers to the deﬁnition of individual achievement. A simple
application of the EOp scheme to the school system would imply evaluating
the eﬀects of circumstances on the individual educational outcomes (years of
schooling, test scores, graduation marks, etc.). However, even without denying
that education has a value per se, one could also argue that education has
a indirect or instrumental value and that the ﬁnal achievements of education
should be expressed by some indicators of the value assigned to education in
the labour market. Education can be seen as an important determinant of
future earning capacity of individuals and, thereby, of their future well-being.
To defend such a consequentialist view of education, consider that this kind of
reasoning is perfectly in tune with the economic role recognized to education
in mainstream economic theory, namely the one that sees education essentially
as an investment in human capital (Becker, 1993). Hence, it seems coherent
with such an approach to evaluate diﬀerent education systems, also in equity
terms, by looking at their eﬀects on the earnings of individuals, for these are
the ﬁnal achievements of an investment in education. Consequently, in our
empirical application we propose two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the educational
outcomes: ﬁrst we study the extent of equality of opportunity with respect to
academic achievements as measured by the probability of graduation and the
actual graduation marks; second we study the transition of university graduates
to the labour market and analyze the equality of opportunity with respect to
actual earnings.
L e tu sn o ws u m m a r i z et h es t r a t e g yw ep r o p o s ei nt h ep a p e r .
Consider a given population and a distribution of a particular form of indi-
vidual outcomes (income, educational achievements, etc.) which is assumed to
be determined by two classes of variables: circumstances and eﬀort. Now parti-
tion the population into types, a type being a group of people endowed with the
same circumstances. If we assume that the individual outcome is determined
only by circumstances and eﬀort, and that the distribution of eﬀort is indepen-
dent from circumstances, then all the variation of outcomes (say, incomes or test
scores) of individuals within a given type would be assumed to be caused by
diﬀerential personal eﬀort. That is to say, the outcome distribution conditional
to circumstances can be interpreted as the set of outcomes open to individuals
with the same circumstances: the opportunity set - expressed in outcome terms
- open to any individual in that type. Hence, comparing the opportunity sets
of two individuals endowed with diﬀerent circumstances amounts to comparing
their type conditional distributions. Roughly speaking, inequality of opportu-
nities in this scenario is revealed by inequality between types distributions.
Exploiting this idea we ﬁrst propose diﬀerent deﬁn i t i o n so fe q u a l i t yo fo p -
5portunity in education. Then, we provide testable conditions with the aim of
(i) testing for the existence of EOp in a given distribution and (ii) ranking dis-
tributions on the basis of EOp. Deﬁnitions and conditions resort to standard
stochastic dominance tools. Dominance conditions are therefore tested by using
non-parametric tests of stochastic dominance developed by Beach and Davidson
(1983) and Davidson and Duclos (2000).
We then propose an empirical analysis of equality of opportunity in the
Italian university system using diﬀerent surveys over the period 2000-2004 and
compare two Italian macro-regions, South and North-Centre. This choice is sug-
gested by the existence of an empirical literature which shows (i) higher degree
of social mobility and equality of opportunity for income in the northern regions
(Checchi and Dardanoni, 2002 and Checchi and Peragine, 2005) and, with re-
spect to school achievements, (ii) a stronger eﬀect of the family background on
the test scores of high school students in the South (Checchi and Peragine, 2005
Checchi et al., 2007). Our empirical application intends to add new evidence
on this issue by focusing speciﬁcally on the highest education segment.
Our empirical results show that the strong family eﬀect detected by previous
studies is also preserved both in tertiary education and in the transition of
graduates to the labour market. It also reveals that the inequality of opportunity
is stronger when looking at the eﬀects of family background on graduation marks
and drop out rates than when examining graduates’ incomes. Moreover, it turns
out that the inequality of opportunity is more severe in the South than in the
regions of North-Centre particularly in the case of income distributions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our charac-
terization of equality of educational opportunity. We ﬁrst propose a deﬁnition of
equality of educational opportunities; we then develop a comprehensive model
that allows to test for equality of opportunity and to rank distributions ac-
cording to educational EOp. In Section 3 we provide an empirical analysis of
equality of opportunity for higher education in Italy. Some concluding remarks
appear in Section 4.
2 Equality of educational opportunities
2.1 The analytical framework
We have a society of individuals, where each individual is completely described
by a list of traits partitioned into two diﬀerent classes: traits beyond the individ-
ual responsibility, represented by a person’s set of circumstances O, belonging to
a ﬁnite set Ω =
©
O1,...,Onª
,with |Ω| = n; and factors for which the individual
is fully responsible, eﬀort for short, represented by a variable e ∈ Θ. Diﬀerent
partitions of the individual traits into circumstances and eﬀort correspond to
diﬀerent notions of equality of opportunity. The value of e actually chosen by
each individual is unobservable. Individual outcome is generated by a function
g : Ω × Θ → <+, so that x = g(e,O), with x ∈ [0,z] ⊆ <+. We do not know
the form of the function g, hence we do not make any assumption about the
6degree of substitutability or complementarity between eﬀort and circumstances;
this issue, which is indeed important at an empirical level, is not speciﬁed here
in order to keep the approach as general as possible. We assume, however, that
the function g is ﬁxed and is the same for all individuals.
A society outcome distribution is represented by a cumulative distribution
function F : <+ → [0,1], belonging to the set Ψ. We can partition any given
population into n subpopulations, each representing a class identiﬁed by the
variable O. For Oi ∈ Ω, we call “type i” the set of individuals whose set of
circumstances is Oi. Within type i there will be a distribution of outcomes,
with density fi (x), c.d.f. Fi (x), population share qF
i and average µF
i .Hence,
for all Oi ∈ Ω, Fi (x) is the outcome distribution conditional to circumstances
Oi.
The distributions of income will diﬀer across types; note however that the
distribution function is a characteristic of the type, not of any individual. The
distribution Fi (x) represents the set of outcome levels which can be achieved -
by exerting diﬀerent degrees of eﬀort - starting from the circumstances Oi. That
is to say, the distribution Fi (x) is a representation of the opportunity set - ex-
pressed in outcome terms - open to any individual endowed with circumstances
Oi. Hence, comparing the opportunity sets of two individuals endowed with
circumstances (Oi,O j) amounts to comparing their type relevant outcome dis-
tributions Fi (x),F j (x). Moreover, evaluating the distribution of opportunity
sets among individuals in a society amounts to evaluate the set of distributions
Φ =
©
F1 (x),...,F n (x)
ª
. In the following sections we exploit this idea2.
2.2 Deﬁning equality of opportunity
We ﬁrst introduce a general deﬁnition of equality of opportunity.
Deﬁnition 1 Given a set of distributions Φ =
©
F1 (x),...,F n (x)
ª
,t h e r ei s
Equality of Opportunity if and only if, for any pair of distributions Fi,F j ∈ Φ,
neither Fi is preferred to Fj,n o rFj is preferred to Fi.
To give content to the deﬁnition above one needs to deﬁne a preference
relation on the set of type conditional distributions. We assume that such a
preference relation can be represented by an evaluation function V : Φ → <+,
and we impose some conditions on such function.
A ﬁrst assumption concerns the aggregation issue, that in this case is a
within-type aggregation. We impose a utilitarian structure. Hence, we propose





where Ui :[ 0 ,z] → <+ is the evaluation function of an individual in type i; it is
assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable (almost everywhere) in x.
2For a diﬀerent approach, which instead focuses on the outcome distributions within the
g r o u p so fp e o p l ew h oe x e r tt h es a m ed e g r e eo fe ﬀort see Roemer (1998), Peragine (2002) and
Checchi and Peragine (2005).
7Next, we introduce a common monotonicity assumption, which guaran-
tees that social welfare does not decrease as a result of an outcome increment,
whatever the type:
(C.1) ∀i ∈ {1,...,n},
dUi(x)
dx
≥ 0,∀x ∈ [0,z].
Next, we assume that our evaluation function is inequality averse. We require
within-type strict inequality aversion:
(C.2) ∀i ∈ {1,...,n},
d2Ui(x)
dx2 < 0,∀x ∈ [0,z].
Alternatively, we could require our function V to be indiﬀerent to outcome
inequality within the same type, therefore assuming within-type inequality
neutrality:
(C.3) ∀i ∈ {1,...,n},
d2Ui(x)
dx2 =0 ,∀x ∈ [0,z].
This condition says that a reduction in outcome inequality within a type,
which leaves the mean of the type unchanged, has no welfare eﬀects. Note that
this welfare condition implies that the function Ui is aﬃne.
Conditions3 (C.1),(C.2) and (C.3) identify several classes of individual util-
ity functions U that implicitly deﬁne classes of evaluation functions V .N o ww e
deﬁne three such classes: the class of types evaluation functions V constructed
as in (1) and with utility functions satisfying conditions (C.1) is denoted by
V1; the class of evaluation functions constructed as in (1) and with utility func-
tions satisfying conditions (C.1) and (C.2) is denoted by V12;t h ec l a s so ft y p e s
evaluation functions constructed as in (1) and with utility functions satisfying
conditions (C.1) and (C.3) is denoted by V13.
The next step consists in deriving suitable criteria for choosing among op-
portunity sets by requiring unanimous agreement among these classes. Hence,
we have the following deﬁnitions of a preference relation over the set Φ of types
distribution functions.
Deﬁnition 2 For all Fi,F j ∈ Φ,
Fi ÂV 1 Fj if and only if V (Fi) Â V (Fj) for all V ∈ V1
Fi ÂV 12 Fj if and only if V (Fi) Â V (Fj) for all V ∈ V12
Fi ÂV 13 Fj if and only if V (Fi) Â V (Fj) for all V ∈ V13
3While in the paper the function V is interpreted as representing the preference relation of
a social planner, it could also be interpreted as an individual utility function over a lottery with
distribution Fi (x) and support [0,z]. Hence, the function V would represent the individual
preferences over the opportunity sets. In this case, conditions (C.2) and (C.3) are to be
interpreted as requirements of strict risk aversion and risk neutrality, respectively.
8Standard results in inequality theory allow to identify the distributional
conditions corresponding to the welfare criteria above.
The ranking ÂV 1 is equivalent to ﬁrst order stochastic dominance (ÂFSD):
Remark 3 For all Fi,F j ∈ Φ,F i ÂV 1 Fj if and only if
Fi ÂFSD Fj ⇐⇒ Fj (x) ≥ Fi (x) for all x ∈ [0,z]
with strict inequality for some x.
The ranking ÂV 12 is equivalent to second order stochastic dominance (ÂSSD):
Remark 4 For all Fi,F j ∈ Φ,F i ÂV 12 Fj if and only if






Fi (x)]dx for all t ∈ [0,z]
with strict inequality for some x.
As it is well known, second order stochastic dominance is equivalent to Gen-
eralized Lorenz dominance (see Shorrocks, 1983).
Finally, the ranking ÂW13 is equivalent to higher expected value.
Remark 5 For all Fi,F j ∈ Φ,F i ÂW13 Fj if and only if µi >µ j.
Given the distributional conditions discussed above, we can now introduce
some criteria to test for the existence of EOp.
2.3 Testing for the existence of EOp
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw em a k eu s eo ft h ed e ﬁnition of equality of opportunity and the
criteria derived in the previous section in order to identify empirical tests for
the existence of equality of opportunity in a distribution of opportunity sets4.
W es t a r tw i t ht h es t r o n g e s td e ﬁnition of EOp, requiring that individuals face
identical prospects of outcome, regardless of their circumstances
Deﬁnition 6 Strong EOp. There is EOp if and only if,∀Fi,F j ∈ Φ,
Fi (x)=Fj (x), ∀x ∈ [0,z]
Since the condition above is extremely demanding and will be violated in
most case we turn to less demanding conditions.
The ﬁrst test is based on the preference relation ÂV 13:
Deﬁnition 7 Weak EOp.T h e r ei sE O pi fa n do n l yi f ,∀Fi,F j ∈ Φ,
Fi ¨V 13 Fjand Fj ¨V 13 Fi ⇔ µi = µj
4Here, we follow the approach proposed by Lefranc et al. (2006 a,b).
9A second test is based on the preference relation ÂV 1:
Deﬁnition 8 EOp1 (EOp of the ﬁrst order). There is EOp if and only if,
∀Fi,F j ∈ Φ,
Fi ¨V 1 Fjand Fj ¨V 1 Fi ⇔ Fi ¨FSD Fj and Fj ¨FSD Fi
T h en e x tt e s ti sb a s e do nt h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o nÂV 12:
Deﬁnition 9 EOp2 (EOp of the second order) There is EOp if and only
if, ∀Fi,F j ∈ Φ,
Fi ¨V 12 FjandFj ¨V 12 Fi ⇔ Fi ¨SSD Fj and Fj ¨SSD Fi
These tests allow us to conclude whether in a given distribution there is EOp
o rn o ta c c o r d i n gt ot h ed i ﬀerent deﬁnitions introduced. In the next section we
address the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity set on the basis of
EOp.
2.4 Ranking distributions of opportunity sets
Our aim is to derive welfare criteria and dominance condition in analogy with
the analysis conducted in the previous section. However, here the criteria have
to be deﬁned over the set of distributions Ψ. Again, we assume that a preference
relation over Ψ can be represented by a social evaluation function W : Ψ → <+.
A generalization of the evaluation function V , discussed in the previous section,
to the case of income distributions, which can be decomposed across homoge-
neous sub-groups, is obtained by aggregating the welfare of each type, weighted
by the relevant population share, and using type-speciﬁc utility functions. If we
opt for an additive aggregation of the types welfare, then we obtain the following









We6 now try to capture the basic intuition beyond the opportunity egalitar-
ian ethics, by selecting diﬀerent classes of utility functions <U 1(x), ..., Un(x) >.
5This utilitarian social welfare approach to the evaluation of equality of opportunity was
ﬁrst proposed by Van de gaer (1993).
6Also in the current scenario, the interpretation of the evaluation function W is ubiquitous.










¯ ¯k ∈ Oi ¤
where, with a slight abuse of notation, Pr
©
k ∈ Oiª
is the probability for an individual k




¯ ¯k ∈ Oi ¤
is the expected utility associated to type i. Hence, our SEF can be expressed
as a weighted sum of the expected utility associated to each type weighted by the probability
to belong to that type.
10First, we could impose on the types speciﬁc functions Ui properties (C.1), (C.2)
and (C.3) already introduced in the previous section, which are not type-speciﬁc.
In addition, we now formulate some type dependent properties.
First, we deﬁne a condition expressing inequality aversion between the op-








,∀i ∈ {1,...,n − 1},∀x ∈ [0,z],
which says that the marginal increase in welfare due to an increment of income
is a decreasing function of circumstances7.
To the properties already introduced we now add the following condition8:
(C.5) ∀i,j ∈ {1,...,n},Ui(z)=Uj (z)
where z is the maximum possible income. By introducing condition (C.5) any
aﬃne transformation such as, for example, Ui → ai + bUi ,i ss u p p o s e dt ob e
able to aﬀect the results of social comparisons9. This requirement is necessary
in a context with diﬀerent types population.
We now deﬁne two classes of social evaluation functions: the class of social
evaluation functions constructed as in (2) and with utility functions satisfying
conditions (C.1), (C.3), (C.4) and (C.5), denoted by WEOP1;t h ec l a s so fs o c i a l
evaluation functions constructed as in (2) and with utility functions satisfying
conditions (C.1), (C.4) and (C.5), denoted by WEOP2.
The next step consists in deriving suitable welfare and distributional condi-
tions by requiring unanimous agreement among these classes.
Deﬁnition 10 For all F,G ∈ Ψ,
F ºEOP1 G if and only if W (F) ≥ W (G) for all W ∈ WEOP1
F ºEOP2 G if and only if W (F) ≥ W (G) for all W ∈ WEOP2
Thus, we turn to identify a range of tests which, if successful, will ensure
welfare dominance for appropriate classes of SEFs. The aim of the analysis
is the following: given a class of utility functions Ui(x) expressing our ethical
concerns, we seek conditions, expressed in terms of distribution functions Fi(x)
and Gi(x) and population shares qF
i and qG
i ,which are necessary and suﬃcient
for welfare dominance according to the criteria deﬁned above.
We ﬁrst propose the following distributional condition:
7Conditions (C.1),(C.3) and (C.4) entail cardinal unit comparability (cf Sen, 1970).
8An analog condition is introduced by Jenkins and Lambert (1993) in the context of income
inequality in presence of diﬀerences in needs and in order to extend the “sequential generalized
Lorenz dominance” to the case of distributions with diﬀerent types partitions.
9By adding condition (C.5) we pass from cardinal unit comparability to cardinal full com-
parability (cf Sen, 1970).











This test can be interpreted as a second order stochastic dominance (generalized
Lorenz dominance) applied to the distribution of the type means weighted by









Note that by applying such a test, we are implicitly making the following
operations: we evaluate (i) the opportunity set of each type by the weighted
mean qF
i µF
i and (ii) the distribution of opportunity sets by the generalized
Lorenz criterion.
Notice that if we follow the individual “risk” interpretation, then the solution
we are proposing corresponds to evaluate the opportunity set of an individual






multiplied by the probability of belonging to the speciﬁct y p eqF
i ;a n dt o
rank the proﬁles of such opportunity sets according to second order dominance.
The second distributional condition we obtain is the following:








i Gi(x),∀x ∈ [0,z],∀k ∈ (1,...,n)
Proof. See the Appendix.
This theorem characterizes a sequential ﬁrst order stochastic dominance con-
dition, where each type distribution is weighted by the relevant population share.
This condition dictates the following procedure: take ﬁrst the lowest type of the
two distributions and check for dominance; then we add the second lowest type,
then the third lowest type and so on, until all the population is included, per-
forming the dominance check at every stage. We have to perform n diﬀerent
tests, starting form the lowest type, until all types are merged. If these tests
a r ea l w a y sp o s i t i v et h e nw eh a v ew e l f a r ed o m i n a n c ef o rt h ef a m i l yWEOP2 and
t h ec o n v e r s ei sa l s ot r u e .
We therefore implicitly make the following operations: we evaluate (i) the
opportunity set of each type by the weighted c.d.f. qF
i Fi(x) and (ii) the dis-
tribution of opportunity sets by the Generalized Lorenz criterion. Hence the
diﬀerence with the condition obtained in Theorem 1 lies in the evaluation of
the individual opportunity set: in the criterion ≥IOP1 it is evaluated by the
weighted expected value, while in the criterion ≥IOP2 each opportunity set is
evaluated by looking at the entire weighted distribution. As for the ranking of
proﬁles of opportunity sets, the distributive criterion remains the same.
A ﬁnal remark is in order. We have focused on unanimous preference order-
ings for classes of opportunity egalitarian social decision makers rather than on
purely (opportunity) inequality criteria. Consequently, the distributional con-
ditions obtained are expressed in terms of means, c.d.f. and generalized Lorenz
dominance, rather than simple Lorenz dominance.
122.5 A summary
Let us summarize the conditions and the criteria discussed and characterized so
far.
Remark 11 As for the test of existence of equality of opportunity in a given
distribution F, we have proposed the following tests
(1) Weak EOp ⇒ ∀(i,j),µ i = µj
(2) Strong EOp ⇒ ∀(i,j),F i (x)=Fj (x), ∀x ∈ [0,z]
(3) EOp1 ⇒ ∀(i,j),F i ¨FSD Fj and Fj ¨FSD Fi
(4) EOp2 ⇒ ∀(i,j),F i ¨SSD Fj and Fj ¨SSD Fi
Remark 12 As for the ranking of diﬀerent distributions (F,G) according to
equality of opportunity, we have proposed the following criteria. For all F,G
∈ Ψ














3 The empirical analysis: equality of opportu-
nity in the Italian higher education system
In this section we apply the theoretical framework proposed in the previous
section with the aim of analyzing equality of opportunity in the Italian higher
education system. We examine whether ﬁnal graduate students outcomes and
their salaries distributions are characterized by equality of opportunity. Since
we strongly believe that placement in the labour market should also be consid-
ered in order to fully evaluate individual tertiary education outcome, we analyze
both the income distribution after three years from graduation and the income
distribution of those who have held a degree for more than three years. The
choice of three years as a threshold is related to the speciﬁc design of the survey
of graduates we use in the empirical application (individuals are interviewed
after three from the completion of their studies). In our analysis individual cir-
cumstances are represented by parental education. Moreover, since our analysis
also extends to consider the existence of regional disparities in Italy, the con-
ditional distributions of two Italian macro-regions, the North-Center and the
South, are compared and ranked according to diﬀerent notions of EOp. In what
follows we present the data and the empirical methodology, ﬁnally we discuss
the results.
133.1 Data description
In this application we use three outcome variables: graduation marks10,n e t
monthly income after three years from graduation and annual disposal income
earned after more than three years from graduation, which we simply call in-
come. On the other hand, parental education is measured by the highest edu-
cational attainment in the couple of parents and is divided in four classes. We
therefore allocate the individuals in four types, according to parental education,
as follows: the ﬁrst type corresponds to primary school degree; the second type
to lower secondary school degree; the third type to upper secondary degree; ﬁ-
nally, graduates who have at least one of the parents with a bachelor (or higher
degree) belong to the fourth type. Furthermore, the Italian regions are divided in
two macro-regions as follows: the North-Center comprehends Piemonte, Lom-
bardia, Veneto, Liguria, Trentino, Friuli, Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Umbria,
Marche while the South includes Lazio, Abbruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia,
Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna.11
Information on graduation marks and net monthly income after three years
from graduation are taken from “Indagine sull’Inserimento Professionale dei
Laureati” (IIPL, hereafter), a survey on the transition from college to work of a
representative sample of Italian graduates conducted by the National Statistical
Oﬃce (Istat) in 2004; whereas data on annual disposal income of individuals
who have held a degree for longer than three years are drawn from the Bank of
Italy “Survey of Household Income and Wealth ” (SHIW, hereafter).
The IIPL contains information on individuals who graduated in 2001 and
covers school curriculum, labour market experience in the three years after
graduation, job search activities, household and individual information. The
interviewed sample corresponds to about the 17 percent of the population of
graduates of 2001. The sample dimension is considerable as the ratio between
sampled person and the universe is roughly 1:6. In total the sample consists of
about 30,000 individuals (41.4% from Southern and 58.6% from North-Center
Universities). Diﬀerently, the SHIW contains detailed information on household
composition, age, education, labour market variables, incomes (for individuals
and households), savings, consumption and wealth, of Italian households and
household members. This survey has been conducted regularly from the Bank of
Italy since 1965. However, since we need information on the year of college com-
pletion we only consider the last three waves (2000, 2002 and 2004) available.
We drop the panel component of those three waves and express income in terms
of euro at 2000. In this sample the graduates who have completed their studies
for at least four years are 1.795 (39% in the South and 61% in the North).12
10In Italy the ﬁnal graduation mark ranges from 66 to 110 cum laude, in this analysis the
110 cum laude was simply transformed in 111
11Note that we include Lazio among the Southern region in order to balance the number
of observations between the two macro-regions. However, considering Lazio as a Southern or
Northern region does not signiﬁcantly change the results which are available from the authors
upon request.
12We consider graduates people declaring to hold a short-course university degree (“diploma
universitario”), a bachelor’s degree, or a postgraduate qualiﬁcation.
14Notice that while in the case of IIPL the sample is divided in North-Center and
South with respect to the geographical location of the University attended, in
the case of SHIW the macro-regions are deﬁned on the basis of the individuals
region of residence. In fact, because of internal mobility, the University site
would not be a good proxy for geographical location after a long period from
graduation.
Lastly, we acknowledge that, in order to investigate the academic perfor-
mance, we must consider not only the students who succeeded and graduated
but also those who failed their attempts to complete tertiary education. In or-
der to do so, we use a parallel survey conducted by Istat on the transition from
high school to college, “Indagine sull’Inserimento Professionale dei Diplomati”
(this information is indeed not available in IIPL, where only graduates are in-
terviewed). This survey conducted in 2001 collects information on students that
completed high school in 1998. In order to take into account the drop-out rate
we calculate the probability of dropping out after three years from matriculation
for each type and macro-region. Hence, we add to the sample of graduates of
the IIPL, in each type and region, a number of students with ﬁnal mark equal
to zero proportionally to the drop-out rate.
Notice also that in this analysis we ignore the fact that the data contained
in those surveys do not concern the same individuals, information are matched
on the basis of circumstances. Summary statistics follow in the Appendix.
3.2 Statistical analysis and methodology
Our samples allow to build outcome (i.e. ﬁnal marks and income) distributions
conditional on circumstances and perform a simple twofold analysis.
We assess equality of distribution as developed in Beach and Davidson (1983)
and perform ﬁrst and second order stochastic dominance tests using Davidson
and Duclos (2000) methodology. The details of the tests implemented are illus-
trated in the Appendix.
In order to draw our conclusion we carry out the following empirical proce-
dure, as described in Lefranc et al. (2006). We conduct a separate analysis for
the two macro-regions and, for all the possible pairs of circumstances i and j
w i t h i nt h es a m er e g i o n ,w ep e r f orm four tests independently:
-T e s t( 1 )( Weak EOp): t e s t st h en u l lo fe q u a l i t yo ft h em e a n so ft h e
distribution of types i and j;
-T e s t( 2 )( Strong EOp): tests the null of equality of the distributions of
types i and j;
-T e s t( 3 )( EOp1): tests the null of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance of the
distribution of type i over j and viceversa;
-T e s t( 4 )( EOp2): tests the null of second-order dominance of the distrib-
ution of type i over j and viceversa.
Then we pursue the following strategy:
• If the null of Test (1) or Test (2) is not rejected, we conclude that Weak
or Strong EOp is satisﬁed.
15• If Test (3) or (4) accepts dominance of one distribution over the other but
not the other way around, we say that equality of opportunity is violated.
• If Test (3) rejects dominance of each distribution over the other we say
that equality of opportunity of the ﬁrst order is supported.
• If Test (3) and (4) conclude that the two distributions dominate each other
we give priority to the results of Test (2).
Accordingly, we proceed by comparing the results obtained for the two
macro-regions.
The drawback of such approach is that it does not allow us to rank diﬀerent
situations in which we would reject equality of opportunity. Hence, in case we
ﬁnd evidence of inequality of opportunity we move to the second step of our
analysis, that is we look for partial ranking of the distributions of opportunity
sets in the two macro-regions. Hence, in order to do so, we rely on the dominance
conditions characterized in Theorems 1 and 2. We ﬁrst verify the existence of
the partial ranking ≥IOP1 by numerical comparison of the distributions of the
type (weighted) means of the two regions [Test (5)]. Next, we apply the second
criterion (F ≥IOP2 G) by sequentially testing the following null hypotheses of
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance:
1. qF














i Fi(x) ≤ Σ4
i=1qG
i Gi(x).
Where F and G are the conditional outcome distributions of North-Centre
and South, respectively [Test (6)]. In these cases the same strategy of Test (3)
is implemented.
3.3 Empirical results
In this section, we report the results of the tests of equality and stochastic
dominance for the outcomes distributions conditional on four classes of parental
education in the two macro-regions. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the cumulative
distribution functions conditional on parental education of marks, income after
three years from graduation and income.
As far as the graduation ﬁnal marks is concerned a clear ranking of types
emerges both in the North-Centre and in the South. The distribution of the
fourth type dominates over the third, the third dominates over the second, the
second dominates over the ﬁrst. This visual ranking is strongly conﬁrmed by the
results of the tests of equality and stochastic dominance (see Table 2). The tests
clearly indicate evidence of strong inequality of opportunity among individuals
b e l o n g i n gt od i ﬀerent types, both in the South and in the North-Centre.
16We have also repeated the same analysis conditioning the graduation marks
on the type of upper secondary school attended13. Graduates have been there-
fore divided in two groups: the ones that attended a “liceo” and those who
attended an “istituto” school type14.T h er e s u l t so b t a i n e di nb o t hg r o u p sc o n -
ﬁrm what described in the general unconditioned case (see Figure 1bis, i.e. the
cumulative distributions function of ﬁnal graduation marks for graduates that
attended the “istituto” school type). This result is quite surprising. Indeed, it
is generally recognized that in Italy students are streamed in diﬀerent tracks
more in consequence of their background than of their ability, and that, after
enrolling in a track, the probability of entering in higher education still depends
on family background (Checchi and Flabbi, 2007). Interestingly, our analysis
shows that the eﬀects of family background goes even further: after sorting the
students according to their family backgrounds in diﬀerent tracks, we ﬁnd that
the family of origin still matters for future academic performances within each
track.
Turning to the dominance conditions, we notice that the weighted means
are always higher in the South than in the North-Center for the graduation
marks distributions (see Table 3): in the South marks are higher than in the
North-Centre, and this is true for each type. However, results based on either
the criterion ≥IOP1 or ≥IOP2 show a mixed pattern: the South dominates the
North-Centre in all cases but the third. Hence, we cannot conclude for any
dominance according to ≥IOP criteria in the case of mark distribution.
Notice that our main conclusion on ﬁnal graduation marks does not change
even when we condition the distribution on the area of academic specialization
(Humanities and Social Science on one hand, Medicine, Science and Engineering
on the other hand). Hence it is a quite robust result.
Turning the analysis to the income variables we notice that we are not able
to make an explicit assessment just observing the cumulative distributions of
income (Figure 2 and 3): in both cases the visual ranking is not very clear.
Similarly the results of the statistical tests are not so deﬁnite as in the case of
the graduation marks. In particular, in the case of the IIPL income we notice
that the null of equivalence of means cannot be rejected at 5% of signiﬁcance
level in more cases in the North-Centre than in the South. From the tests of
13The type of secondary school attended is a crucial variable when studying the family
background eﬀect on Italian students’ performances. In fact, the Italian upper secondary
school is a tracked system, with three diﬀerent path which can be freely chosen by the pupils
at the age of 13 (i.e., by their parents): an academic oriented generalist education provided
by high schools (5 years, called licei), a technically oriented education provided by technical
schools (5 years, called istituti tecnici), and a vocational training oﬀered by local schools
organized at regional level (3 years, called istituti di formazione professionale). After a debated
reform in 1969, students from any track are entitled to enrol in Colleges and Universities,
conditional on having successfully completed 5 years of upper secondary schooling. However,
each of these tracks predicts very diﬀerent outcomes in terms of additional education acquired
and labour market performance. As a matter of facts, more than 88% of students who graduate
from licei enrol in a University as opposed to 17.8% of the students coming from the vocational
track.
14Within the category "istituto" we included all the upper secondary schools diﬀerent from
“liceo”.
17stochastic dominance (Table 2) we generally notice that there is more evidence
of equality of opportunities in the North-Centre than in the South, i.e. we do
not reach a clear cut conclusion on dominance in three cases in the North-
Centre and in only one case in the South. On the other hand, the results from
inequality of opportunity comparisons allow us to reach a more deﬁnite result.
Since (i) the weighted means are in all cases higher in the North-Centre than in
the South (see Table 3) and (ii) the sequential ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
condition is satisﬁed (see Table 4) we can conclude that in the North-Centre
there is more equality of opportunity than in the South when looking at levels
of income three years after graduation.
These ﬁgures are consistent with the general view of less intergenerational
mobility in the South than in the North of Italy. Also in this case we have
repeated the exercise for conditioned income distribution. In particular, here
we have studied separately the earnings of those who got medium-low graduation
marks and the earnings of those who got medium-high gradation marks. Overall
the results do not change when analyzing those two groups with respect to the
general unconditioned case (see Figure 2bis, i.e. the cumulative distributions
function of income after three years from graduation of individuals that received
a medium-high ﬁnal mark).
As far as the SHIW income is concerned the null of equivalence of means
cannot be rejected at 5% of signiﬁcance level in one more case in the South than
in the North-Centre (see Table 1). The same evidence is shown in the tests for
ﬁrst and second dominance (see Table 2). Turning to the EOp ranking the
ﬁgures obtained for income shows evidence of dominance of the North-Centre
over the South only according to the ≥IOP1 criterion. Diﬀerently, the North-
Centre dominates the South in all the steps of the sequential procedure except
the ﬁrst. Therefore we conclude that the distributions of the macro-regions are
not comparable according to ≥IOP2 in the case of income.
Summarizing, although some of our dominance conditions are not fully sat-
isﬁed - and this is quite normal when using partial ranking - a general picture
seems to emerge from the analysis of opportunity inequality for income: the
southern regions have lower per-capita income accompanied by greater overall
income inequality and by higher degree of opportunity inequality.15
In conclusion, our analysis shows that, while most of the parental background
exerts its eﬀect through favouring the educational attainment of the students,
it keeps on playing a role in the labour market, independently from education.
This could represent the impact that family networking plays in ﬁnding good
jobs. Our evidence shows that this eﬀect is stronger in the South than in the
15In the interpretation of the results, it should be reminded that our dominance criteria
≥IOP1 and ≥IOP2 reﬂect both distributive and aggregate aspects. It is possible that the
dominance of the North-Centre over the South in income levels is driven by a average eﬀect,
rather than a pure inequality eﬀect. Therefore, we have also performed pure inequality com-
parisons by Lorenz dominance test. In general, the results exhibit the same evidence found
for the ≥IOP1 and ≥IOP2 dominace test for graduation marks. On the other hand, in the
case of income distributions, Lorenz dominance tests show dominance of the South over the
North-Centre in the ﬁrst step of the sequential strategy, and dominance of the North-Centre
over the South in the remaining steps.
18North-Centre.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Building on the existing literature on equality of opportunity, in this paper
we have proposed a deﬁnition of equality of educational opportunities and a
methodology to test for the existence of equality of opportunity in a given distri-
bution and to rank distributions according to equality of opportunity. Moreover,
we have provided an empirical application by studying the degree of equality of
educational opportunity in the Italian university system.
We have compared two Italian macro-regions, South and North-Centre, ac-
c o r d i n gt oe q u a l i t yo fo p p o r t u n i t y .I nt h eﬁrst application we have focused on
individual graduation scores, while in the second we have considered the distri-
bution of incomes among Italian graduates; in both cases we have studied how
these diﬀerent individual achievements vary according to the family background,
as measured by the level of parental education.
Our empirical results show a strong family eﬀect on the performances of stu-
dents in the university and on the transition of graduates in the labour market.
In addition, our analysis reveals that the degree of opportunity inequality is
stronger when looking at the eﬀects of family background on graduation marks
and drop out rates than when examining graduates’ incomes. Moreover the
inequality of opportunity turns out to be more severe in the South than in the
regions of North-Centre especially for income distributions.
One wonders whether these eﬀects may be addressed by appropriate policies.
To begin with, our results point to the role of higher education policies.
In recent years the Italian university system has been involved in a deep
process of reform, which has reduced the years of enrolment and has signiﬁ-
cantly enlarged the educational supply, in terms of possible curricula from which
the students may choose. So far, the existing data show that this reform has
increased the number of students enrolled in the university. Indeed, it would be
extremely interesting to study the eﬀect of such a reform from the equality of
opportunity viewpoint: has the incidence of social background on the academic
performance of students increased or decreased as eﬀect of the reform? Unfor-
tunately, the available data do not allow yet to draw conclusions on the eﬀect
of the reform. However, as soon as the relevant data will become available this
will certainly be object of further investigation.
T h es a m et y p eo fd i ﬃculty seems to emerge in the labour market. The eﬀect
of social origin plays a role in the earnings distributions, even among graduates
with the same ﬁnal marks and, again, this eﬀect is stronger in the South than
in the North. This could represent the impact of family networking in ﬁnding
good jobs, as well as a reduced availability of good jobs in less technologically
advanced areas. This greater obstacles and/or lack of adequate incentives in
local labour markets can be linked to existing evidence of internal migration
ﬂows, which speaks of a sort of “brain drain”, that is strong migration of high
skilled workers from the South towards the Northern regions. While part of
19this migration is certainly explained by the diﬀerent unemployment rates, ex-
isting studies show that the choice to migrate is specially concentrated among
individuals with poor family background (see Coniglio and Peragine, 2007).
Finally, we would suggest some possible connection between what observed
in the distributions of graduation scores of individuals coming from diﬀerent so-
cial origin and what seen in the income distribution of the same social groups.
Inequality of opportunities in the labour market may stem from the opaque
working of the Italian labour market but also from some features of the univer-
sity system. The evidence of generally higher marks in southern regions and of
as t r o n ge ﬀects of the family backgrounds on those marks, speaks of a univer-
sity system that is hardly able to properly signal abilities and competencies of
the students. But if the school system fails to be fully meritocratic and select
according to abilities, then it is easier that other allocation mechanisms might
prevail also in the labour market. Unfortunately, this does not come as a sur-
prise in a country where more than 50% of the working population declares to
have obtained the current job through recommendations of relatives or friends.
205T a b l e s a n d ﬁgures
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Table 1. Test (1) Weak EOp
Graduation mark
North-Centre South
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 - <∗∗ <∗ <∗ - <∗ <∗ <∗
2 - <∗ <∗ - <∗ <∗
3 - <∗ - <∗
4 - -
Income after 3 years from graduation
1 - =∗ <∗ <∗ - <∗ =∗ <∗
2 - =∗ =∗ - <∗∗ <∗
3 - =∗ - =∗
4 - -
Income
1 - =∗ <∗ <∗ - =∗ =∗ <∗∗
2 - =∗ <∗ - =∗ <∗
3 - <∗ - <∗
4 - -
Notes: ∗,∗∗denote 5 and 10% level of signiﬁcance, respectively. > the mean of the distri-
bution in the row is grater than the mean of the distribution in the column; = the means are
23equal.
Table 2. Test (2) - (4) EOp 1 and EOp 2
First Order Dominance Second Order Dominance
North-Centre South North-Centre South
Graduation mark Graduation mark
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 - <∗ <∗ <∗ - <∗ <∗ <∗ - <∗∗ <∗ <∗ - <∗ <∗ <∗
2 - <∗ <∗ - <∗ <∗ - <∗ <∗ - <∗ <∗
3 - <∗ - <∗ - <∗ - <∗
4 - - - -
Income 3 years after graduation Income 3 years after graduation
1 - <∗ <∗ <∗ - 6=∗ <∗ <∗ - <∗ <∗ <∗ - 6=∗ <∗ <∗
2 - 6=∗ 6=∗ - <∗ <∗ - 6=∗ 6=∗ - <∗ <∗
3 - 6=∗ - <∗ - 6=∗ - <∗∗
4 - - - -
Income Income
1 - 6=∗ <∗ <∗ - 6=∗ 6=∗ <∗∗ - 6=∗ <∗ <∗ - 6=∗ 6=∗ <∗∗
2 - 6=∗ <∗ - 6=∗ <∗ - 6=∗ <∗ - 6=∗ <∗
3 - <∗ - <∗ - <∗ - <∗
4 - - - -
Notes: > the row dominates the column; < the column dominates the row; = the curves are
equal; 6= the curves are diﬀerent and cannot be ranked. See also notes to Table 1.

















Notes: See notes to Table 1.
24Table 4. Test (6) IOP2
Graduation mark
North-Centre















Notes: See notes to Tables 1 and 2.
256A p p e n d i c e s
6.1 Summary statistics
Table 5. Summary statistics
Types North-Centre South
Mean1
















































































Notes: 1 Sample Mean; 2 Sample Standard error; 3 Sample number of observations; 4 Monthly
income; 4 Annual income
6.2 Proofs
Proof. of Theorem 2
We ﬁrst state and prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1
Pn
k=1 vkwk ≥ 0 for all sets of real numbers {vk} such that vk ≥
vk+1 ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1,...,n}, if and only if
Pk
i=1 wi ≥ 0 , ∀k ∈ {1,...,n}.





k=1 (vk − vk+1)
Pk
i=1 wi.
It is obvious that, if
Pk
i=1 wi ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1,...,n}, then
Pn
k=1 vkwk ≥ 0. As for
the necessity part, suppose that
Pn
k=1 vkwk ≥ 0 for all sets of numbers {vk} such
26that vk ≥ vk+1 ≥ 0 , but ∃ j ∈ {1,...,n} such that
Pj
i=1 wi < 0. Consider what
happens when (vk − vk+1) & 0, ∀k 6= j. We obtain:
Pn
k=1 vkwk → (vj −
vj+1)
Pj
i=1 wi < 0, which is the desired contradiction.
We can now prove the theorem, which states that ∆W = W (F)−W (G) ≥ 0,








i Fi(x),∀x ∈ [0,z],∀k ∈ (1,...,n).













for all the functions Ui satisfying conditions C.1 and C.4. Using integration by































Gi (x)dx ≥ 0.






































or, equivalently, Z z
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i Gi(x) − qF
i Fi(x)
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dx ≥ 0, we
can apply Lemma 1. Hence we obtain that T (x) ≥ 0, ∀ U satisfying C.1 and








i Fi(x),∀x ∈ [0,z],∀k ∈ (1,...,n)
27Clearly, if T (x) ≥ 0 ∀x, then
R z
0 T (x)dx ≥ 0,∀x, which proves the suﬃciency
part of the theorem.
As for the necessity part, suppose, for a contradiction, that ∆W ≥ 0,∀W ∈




i Gi(x) − qG
i Fi(x)
¢
< 0,∀x ∈ I. Then, by Lemma 1, ∃ a set of functions











∀x ∈ I. Thus we have ∆W =
R 1
0 T(x)dx, where T(x) < 0∀x ∈ I. Clearly,
R b
a T(x)dx < 0. Now we can select a function T(x) (i.e., sets of functions Ui and
distributions Fi (x) and Gi (x)) such that T(x) & 0 ∀x ∈ [0,z]\I. In this case




a T(x)dx < 0. A contradiction.
6.3 Statistical tests
The testing procedures used in the empirical application of this paper have been
developed by Beach and Davidson (1983) and Davidson and Duclos (2000). We
consider mainly equality tests and stochastic dominance tests of ﬁrst and second
order. In this Appendix, as a matter of notation, we represent the two order
of stochastic dominance using the integral operator, Ij(.;F) to be the function









The general hypotheses for testing stochastic dominance of order j of the dis-
tribution F over G can be written as follow:
H
j
0 : Ij(x,F) ≤ Ij(x,G) ∀x ∈ [0,z]
H
j
1 : Ij(x,F) >I j(x,G) ∀x ∈ [0,z].
The tests are based on comparisons of the (diﬀerence in the) distribution func-
tions (and integrals thereof) at a ﬁxed number of points, k (in the paper we use
5 points in the outcome variable range). Deﬁning those diﬀerences as a (k × 1)
vector ∆j(xl)=Ij(xl,F)−Ij(xl,G) we specify the equality and the stochastic
dominance test accordingly.
Equality tests. The equality of distributions test is performed by a Wald
test and apply a χ2 test. The hypothesis system is the following:
H0 : ∆j(xl)=0for all l ∈ {1,...,k}
H1 : ∆j(xl) 6=0for some l ∈ {1,...,k}.
Deﬁning ˆ ∆j as the (k × 1) vector of estimates of ∆j(xl) and ˆ Σj as the estimates
of the variance covariance matrix of ˆ ∆j, it can be shown that under the null









NG . Therefore, the statistic under the null hypothesis is





See Beach and Davidson (1983) for details.
Stochastic dominance tests. In this case we follow the methods consid-




0 : ∆j(xl) ≤ 0 for all l ∈ {1,...,k}
H
j
1 : ∆j(xl) > 0 for some l ∈ {1,...,k}
then the Wald test can be obtained by




















with the weights w denoting the probability that k−l elements of ∆j are strictly
positive. As showed by Wolak (1989), the Wald statistic has an asymptotic
distribution that is a mixture of chi-squared random variables. In particular,
as noted in Barret and Donald (2003), we compute the solutions to a large
number of quadratic programming problems in order to estimate the weights
that appear in the chi-squared mixture limiting distribution and estimate the
p-value of ˆ Wj2 using Monte Carlo simulation.16 See Wolak (1989), Davidson
and Duclos (2000) and Barrett and Donald (2003) for details.
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